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Abstract. This paper examines the health impact of Opportunity 
NYC-Family Rewards, the first conditional cash transfer 
randomized-controlled trial for low-income families in the 
United States. Family Rewards offered cash transfers to 2,377 
families that were conditional upon their investments in 
education, preventive health care, and parental employment; 
and compared their health to a control group of 2,372 
families. The program operated between 2007 and 2010 in New 
York City. It led to a modest improvement in health insurance 
coverage and a large increase in preventive dental care. It 
improved parents’ perception of their own health and levels of 
hope (a measure associated with positive mental health), 
mainly through improvements in reported financial wellbeing. 
While impacts on physical health are weaker, our study may not 
have captured effects on chronic disease risk or management 
that may take longer to accrue.   
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Introduction 
 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) have become widespread in 
low- and middle-income countries over the last 15 years (1). 
CCTs provide cash benefits to families on the condition that 
they engage in activities that generate long-term benefits, 
such as using preventive care services or attending school 
regularly (1). These programs pursue two simultaneous 
objectives: to reduce immediate financial hardship, and to 
promote parental investment in both their own and their 
children’s wellbeing. The overarching idea is that such 
incentives will break the intergenerational cycle of poverty 
and generate individual as well as societal benefits (1).  
 
In 2007, the Center for Economic Opportunity of the New York 
City Mayor’s Office initiated the first CCT in the United 
States (US), Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards (‘Family Rewards’ 
hereafter). The program was explicitly modelled after Mexico’s 
Oportunidades (2). It was privately funded (3) and offered to 
low-income families in six of New York City’s most deprived 
communities. It operated for three years and provided cash 
rewards in the areas of children’s education, preventive 
health care and employment (4).  
 
There are two main mechanisms through which Family Rewards 
might improve the health of poor families. First, through its 
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health-related incentives, it encourages participating 
families to increase the use of preventive care services. The 
expectation is that such increases would translate into better 
health outcomes. Second, the increase in family income brought 
by the cash transfer might increase the ability to invest in 
healthy lifestyles and reduce financial stress, both risk 
factors for poor physical and mental health (5).  
 
Robust evaluations of CCTs in low- and middle-income countries 
suggest that they hold promise as tools for improving 
population health (6). Oportunidades and similar interventions 
across Latin America led to large increases in health services 
use, including the number of visits to health facilities, 
receipt of prenatal care and pediatric examinations (7-9). 
Evidence shows that CCTs also improved some distal health 
outcomes, in particular developmental, nutritional and 
cognitive measures among children (10, 11).  
 
In this paper, we examine the impact of Family Rewards on the 
health of low-income families. We synthesize findings from and 
extend upon previous reports on this program (4, 12, 13) by 
examining effects on both proximal health care use outcomes 
directly incentivized by the program and distal health 
outcomes. We also explore some of the mechanisms through which 
Family Rewards may have impacted the health of participating 
families.  
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The Family Rewards experiment: design and previous findings 
 
The program was conceived by the Center for Economic 
Opportunity at the Mayor’s Office, in partnership with MDRC (a 
nonprofit social policy evaluation organization), and Seedco 
(a workforce and economic development organization)(14).  
 
Three key adaptations were necessary to tailor the program to 
an urban high-income setting (2). Family Rewards was designed 
to complement existing government programs such as the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) or the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF). Payments were made conditional on meeting a 
larger number of specific targets (22 potential rewards vs. 6 
in Oportunidades). The aim was to link the reward more 
proximately to specific behaviors (4). Unlike its 
predecessors, Family Rewards offered rewards in the domain of 
parental employment in addition to children’s education and 
family preventive health care use.  
 
Family Rewards offered cash rewards for 22 activities in its 
three core areas (see Appendix Exhibit 1) (15). Multiple 
rewards were offered in each domain, with the hope that the 
net effect would provide a significant boost in household 
income. For a three-year period, participating families were 
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eligible to receive the cash transfers every two months. All 
behaviors were verified by Seedco using administrative data or 
coupons submitted by families. Seedco also oversaw the payment 
system. No limits or conditions were imposed on how families 
decided to spend the rewards. Family Rewards received ethical 
approval from the MDRC Institutional Review Board.  
 
Health-related conditions included continuous health insurance 
coverage, preventive health care checkups and dental care. 
Incentives for obtaining and sustaining health insurance were 
available to those families that were eligible for publicly 
provided health insurance through Medicaid (including the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program and Family Health Plus) or 
through their employers (4). Rewards were designed to 
encourage families to get comprehensive preventive care and 
use private or community health services (rather than the 
emergency services) for routine care.  
 
The program was evaluated using a randomized controlled trial 
design: 4,749 families recruited at baseline were randomly 
allocated to receiving Family Rewards incentives (treated 
group, N=2,377) or to a control group that was not offered 
incentives (N=2,372). The sample was recruited between July 
2007 and January 2008 and the program operated for three years 
(Appendix Exhibit 2) (16). Eligibility was based on a 
combination of family income (at or below 130% of the federal 
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poverty level), entering grade of the child in September 2007 
(4th, 7th and 9th grade), home location (six community districts 
in the Bronx, Brooklyn and Manhattan) and citizenship status 
(citizen or legal resident at the time of enrolment).  
 
Family Rewards distributed a total of $20.6 million in cash 
transfers to participating families (13). Roughly 98% of 
families received cash incentives in the education and health 
domains while only 53% earned a work reward (12). Family 
Rewards led to a significant increase in household income and 
a reduction in poverty rates and material hardship (17). These 
improvements weakened once the cash transfers were no longer 
available but the positive effect on perceived financial well-
being was sustained beyond the end of the program (13). Family 
Rewards improved graduation rates for 9th graders at study 
entry and other school outcomes for those who entered high 
school as proficient readers (12). Parental self-reported 
employment increased as a result of the program, but it was 
not confirmed by administrative data from the Unemployment 
Insurance System (12). Additional details on the program can 
be found in the 2010 MDRC report, which also includes a 
qualitative evaluation of the implementation of Family Rewards 
from the perspective of users and staff (4).  
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In this paper, we examine further the impact of the program on 
health care use and health outcomes; and explore potential 
mechanisms linking the cash transfer to health. 
 
Study Data and Methods 
 
Design 
 
The analysis draws on three rounds of survey data, capturing 
baseline, in-program and post-program outcomes. Survey data 
were first collected at baseline for all participants (4,749 
families), covering demographic, socioeconomic and health 
status information prior to study entry. A randomly selected 
subset of the sample was then interviewed face-to-face at 18 
(3,082 families) and 42 months (2,966 families). The 42-month 
survey was fielded six months after the program ended. 
Response rates at 18 and 42 months were 84% and 82% for the 
program group; and 80% and 76% for the control group, 
respectively. Previous analyses suggest that program and 
control groups were representative of baseline 
characteristics, and that there were no systematic differences 
in response rates or missing data (12, 17).  
 
Outcome measures 
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Health care use. Respondents were asked whether they and their 
children had medical coverage (of any type) in the previous 
month. Preventive health care use was assessed as binary 
indicators of whether the respondent had seen their personal 
doctor or health care provider in the past 12 months, had at 
least two dental visits in the past year, had the emergency 
room as usual source of care in past year, and whether he/she 
was treated for any medical condition in the past year. Unmet 
health care needs measured whether the respondent did not have 
medical care because of financial constraints in the past 
year; and whether the respondent did not fill a prescription 
because of financial constrains in the past year. 
 
Children’s health care access was assessed by asking parents 
whether the child had a routine health care provider and a 
personal pediatrician. Preventive health care use was measured 
based on whether the child had a health checkup in the past 
year and whether he/she had at least two dental visits in the 
past year. In addition, for children aged under 6, respondents 
were asked whether the child had a physical examination in the 
past year, a dental checkup in the past year, and whether 
he/she was screened for an early intervention program.  
 
Physical health. For adults, self-reported health was measured 
on a scale, ranging from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent). 
Respondents’ Body Mass Index was measured based on self-
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reported weight and height. Respondents were also asked to 
report whether they had been diagnosed with asthma, high blood 
pressure, high cholesterol or diabetes. Respondents were also 
asked whether they smoked at the time of interview (yes/no). 
 
Physical health measures for children included the child’s 
health as rated by parents (ranging from 1 to 5 with higher 
values indicating better health); and binary indicators of 
whether the child had any health condition (physical, mental 
or learning disability), attention deficit disorder, or 
asthma.  
 
Hope and mental health. The ‘State of Hope’ scale is a 
validated six-item measure of hope (18). It includes two 
dimensions, measuring agency (goal-directed thinking. i.e. 
ability to initiate and sustain action) and pathways (planning 
to accomplish goals) (19). The scale ranges from 6 (low hope) 
to 24 (high hope). Higher levels of hope are associated with 
several indicators of positive mental health, while low levels 
of hope are associated with symptoms of mental illness and 
depression (20). 
At 18 months, respondents were asked if they had experienced a 
serious psychological distress in the past month and were 
administered the Kessler Psychological Distress (K10) scale, a 
validated 10-item measure of psychological distress 
experienced in the past month (21). Scores range from 10 (no 
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distress) to 50 (severe distress). The ‘State of Hope’ scale 
and the K10 scale were measured among a randomly selected sub-
sample of respondents (N=2,043). 
 
Perceived material circumstances. A perceived financial 
wellbeing score was calculated by asking respondents whether 
they agreed with the following statements: ‘your financial 
situation is better than last year’; ‘you don’t worry about 
having enough money in the future’; ‘you can generally afford 
to buy needed things’; ‘you sometimes have enough money to buy 
something or go somewhere just for fun’. The score ranges from 
4 to 16 points, with higher scores indicating higher financial 
wellbeing. The food insufficiency scale assesses whether 
families have enough to eat in the past month. The scale 
ranges from 1 (often not enough to eat) to 4 (enough to eat of 
the kinds of food desired).  
 
Approach 
 
As Family Rewards was evaluated through a Randomized 
Controlled Trial (RCT), its effects can be identified by 
comparing outcomes between the program and control groups. The 
two groups were not significantly different in most pre-random 
assignment characteristics (4).  
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We conducted an intent-to-treat analysis to assess the impact 
of Family Rewards on health care use and health, separately 
for parents and children. Ordinary Least Squares regressions 
were estimated to improve precision and eliminate any group 
imbalances. All models controlled for gender, race/ethnicity 
and parental level of education, primary parent’s marital and 
employment status, number of children and primary language 
spoken at home. 
 
We employed an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition approach to 
describe the factors which contributed to the impact of Family 
Rewards on distal health outcomes (22, 23). The method 
decomposes outcome differences between the program and control 
groups into two components: (1) a part attributed to 
differences between the two groups in terms of a number of 
factors affected by the program; and (2) a part attributed to 
differential response to characteristics (22). The advantage 
of this approach is that it reveals the extent to which 
differences in distal measures might be associated with 
specific proximal measures. For example, changes in self-
reported health in the program group might be explained by 
changes in preventive health care use or in health insurance 
coverage. Decomposition analyses used post-treatment follow-up 
assessments of health insurance coverage, preventive health 
care use, unmet health care needs, smoking and financial 
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wellbeing. Further details are provided in Appendix Exhibit 3 
(16). 
 
Limitations 
 
This study has several limitations. First, the decomposition 
approach is descriptive and not a definitive test of the 
relative importance of different mechanisms. Second, the 
integrated nature of the program meant that causal effects can 
be ascribed to the intervention, but not to specific 
incentives. Third, although our results have strong internal 
validity, there are potential limitations to their external 
validity. For one, participants in the RCT may be more 
motivated on average than non-participants to change behaviors 
and report these changes. For another, the intervention 
targeted low-income families, mainly single-headed, African-
American or Latino families, which were representative of 
their neighborhoods (4) but not necessarily of other 
neighborhoods, cities, or nations. The in-program and post-
program data was collected on a randomly selected subsample, 
which reduced statistical power. Previous analyses have 
confirmed that the survey samples provided reliable estimates 
which can be generalized to the study population (12). A final 
limitation relates to physical health measures. Outcomes were 
self-reported and included binary diagnoses of chronic 
conditions, which may fail to capture impacts on disease 
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management or prognosis improved by closer contact with health 
services. Correcting for BMI self-reporting bias did not 
substantially change our results (see Appendix Exhibit 4 
(16)). Data did not include a clinical examination to measure 
effects on subclinical outcomes. This evaluation, therefore, 
offers only a limited window on the potential physical health 
effects of Family Rewards. In addition, no information is 
available on important health behaviors such as drinking, 
nutrition, physical activity or sleep, which could have 
changed in response to the program.  
 
Study Results 
 
Exhibit 1 displays the demographic, socio-economic and health 
characteristics of the sample at randomization. Most 
participating households were headed by a single parent 
(80.9%), most often a mother (94.6%). Nearly all families were 
Hispanic (47.1%) or Black (50.5%). Many families were already 
receiving public assistance at baseline, in the form of food 
stamps (59.4%), housing assistance (53.3%), and TANF (24%). 
Just over half of the sample (51.1%) was working at baseline; 
and only 19.7% of the total sample was working more than 30 
hours per week. Only 5.8% of parents and 2.7% of children had 
no medical insurance coverage in the year preceding the start 
of the program. Most families had used preventive care 
services in the past year, in the form of a medical check-up 
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(81.7% for parents) or dental check-up (64.8% for parents). 
19.1% of adult respondents rated their own health as fair or 
poor. Only 3.5% of children were described by their parents as 
having fair or poor health. Full results are presented in 
Appendix Exhibit 5 (16). 
 
Exhibit 2 shows the effect of Family Rewards on parental 
outcomes at 18 and 42 months. Full results are presented in 
Appendix Exhibit 6 (16). At 18 months, the program led to 
modest albeit statistically significant increases in the 
probability that respondents and their dependent children were 
covered by health insurance (1 percentage point and 1.9 
percentage points respectively, p<0.01). Participants in the 
program group also had a significantly higher probability to 
have seen their personal doctor or health care provider since 
enrolment or to be treated for any medical condition than the 
control group – although these effects were small in magnitude 
(3.9 and 4.2 percentage point difference between the two 
groups respectively, p<0.01). They were also less likely to 
have used the emergency room as their usual source of care in 
the past year (p<0.001). The largest effect was found for 
dental visits with an 11.6 percentage point difference between 
the control and participating group (p<0.001). The program 
also had effects on more distal outcomes. Participants in the 
treatment group were less likely to forego medical care due to 
costs in the past year (p<0.001), and they scored 
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significantly higher than those in the control group on the 
self-rated health scale (p<0.001). The program had no effects 
on other measures of physical health or on the Kessler 
Psychological Distress scale at 18 months. 
 
Post program at 42 months, many of the effects observed in 
program had disappeared. Program participation was still 
associated with a higher probability of having health 
insurance coverage (2.2 percentage point difference, p<0.01). 
The most consistent effect of the program among incentivized 
behaviors was on dental visits (13 percentage point 
difference, p<0.001). A small reduction in unmet health care 
needs persisted. No effect on physical health outcomes was 
detected at 42 months. However, participants randomized to 
Family Rewards scored higher on the ‘State of Hope’ scale by 
half a point (p<0.001). 
 
Exhibit 3 presents the effects on a range of child health 
outcomes. Full results are presented in Appendix Exhibit 7 
(16). The only consistent effect was on dental visits, an 
outcome directly incentivized by the program. Children in the 
intervention group were more likely to have had a dental 
check-up in the past year compared to those in the control 
group (11.8 percentage point difference between the two 
groups, p<0.001). This effect persisted into the 42-month 
survey (14.6 percentage point difference, p<0.001). Family 
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Rewards was not associated with increases in other preventive 
health care use or with health outcomes in children.  
 
We decomposed observed differences in adult self-rated health 
at 18 months and state of hope at 42 months, two distal 
outcomes for which we observed significant improvements. Full 
results are provided in Appendix Exhibit 8 (16). Differences 
between the two groups in factors affected by the program 
explained to a large extent the gap in these outcomes, 
accounting for 56% of the gap in average self-rated health at 
18 months, and 42% of the difference in average hope score at 
42 months. Exhibit 4 details these contributions. Differences 
in average self-rated health at 18 months were primarily 
associated with families in the program group enjoying higher 
levels of financial wellbeing (67% of the difference) and 
using more preventive health care services (33% of the 
difference). Improved financial wellbeing also explained 32% 
of the gap in ‘State of Hope’ score at 42 months between the 
two groups while preventive care use explained 21% of the 
difference. Other factors such as health insurance coverage 
did not significantly contribute to health differences between 
the two groups. 
 
Discussion 
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The objective of this study was to assess its effects on 
health care use and health. Several important findings emerge 
from this experiment. First, the program had modest but 
meaningful effect on some preventive health services, 
especially dental care. Second, Family Rewards had a positive 
impact on parents’ perception of their health as well as level 
of hope, mainly through improvements in reported financial 
wellbeing. While evidence of effects on physical health is 
weaker, our study offers a limited window on these outcomes 
and may not fully capture impacts on chronic disease risk and 
management that may take longer to accrue.  
 
Under the program, poor households made more use of preventive 
health services, a key outcome upon which the transfer was 
conditioned (1). However, the effects remain modest relative 
to those observed in certain Latin American programs where 
baseline levels were low and effects sizes many fold higher 
(8). The exception was dental care, with a difference of 11.6 
to 14.6 percentage points as a result of the program. This is 
an important effect: oral health is one of the largest unmet 
health care needs in the US, and the single largest among 
children (24).  
 
Improvements in intermediate outcomes translated into 
improvements in some distal health outcomes. Adult 
participants reported better self-rated health, which echoes 
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findings from Mexico’s Oportunidades (10, 25). This positive 
effect is remarkable as very few social policy interventions 
in high-income countries have managed to move the needle on 
self-rated health (e.g. 26, 27). At 42 months, program 
participants had also higher scores on the ‘State of Hope’ 
scale. While not a direct measure of mental health, this 
finding should not be underestimated: higher levels of hope in 
adults are associated with higher positive affect, life 
satisfaction, self-esteem, self-rated physical health, and 
reduced depressive symptoms (28). Family Rewards’ effects on 
health were mainly linked to improvements in perceived 
financial wellbeing. Households earned on average $8,674 over 
the three years of the program. It corresponds to a 22% 
increase in average monthly income (12, 13, 17), an effect 
similar to Oportunidades which increased the average income of 
participating families by 25% (9). Reductions in financial 
hardships may be a meaningful pathway by which the program 
exerted an effect.  
 
A key difference between Family Rewards and its Mexican 
predecessor is its lack of effect on children’s health. While 
children in Oportunidades improved on a range of health 
outcomes (10, 11), Family Rewards only increased dental 
visits. Likewise, many measures of adult physical health were 
left unaffected by the program. These findings have been 
largely confirmed in Family Rewards 2.0, a replication study 
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implemented in Memphis and the Bronx after Family Rewards, 
which added family guidance and fewer rewards to the original 
design, but found few health effects on children and adults 
(29). Several factors might explain the mixed effects of 
Family Rewards. Family Rewards operated alongside a range of 
long-standing social programs such as the EITC, TANF and 
Medicaid. This contrasts with lower income countries, where 
CCTs were introduced in the context of relatively limited 
social safety nets. A second, related explanation refers to 
the very high levels of compliance at baseline with behaviors 
incentivized by the program, such as health insurance coverage 
and preventive checkups, in part thanks to previous efforts 
from the City of New York to expand health insurance to low-
income families (30). It consequently left limited room for 
additional take-up. It may also explain the large effects for 
dental care visits, for which baseline levels were lower than 
for other measures of preventive care use. Participating 
families also ended up earning less in rewards than 
anticipated at the inception of the program (12) and the 
positive effect on household income did not last once the cash 
benefits were discontinued. Third, studies in low- and middle-
income countries have largely focused on acute outcomes such 
as birth weight (11). By contrast, our evaluation focused on 
non-communicable diseases and risk factors. Changes in chronic 
disease risk may take longer to manifest than changes in acute 
outcomes, and may consequently not have been captured in the 
21 
 
relatively short-time horizon of our evaluation. Finally, a 
unique aspect of Family Rewards was to add rewards for 
parental employment. While 53.2% of households earned a reward 
in the area of work (17), the program did not produce 
meaningful improvements in parental employment (12) – a key 
outcome on which the long-term effects on health and wellbeing 
had been hypothesized. Weak effects on employment may partly 
be due to the 2008 economic crisis, which happened in the 
middle of the program’s evaluation, and likely limited 
participants’ opportunities for paid employment. This in turn 
points to the limitation of imposing conditions which cannot 
realistically be met.  
 
Policy implications 
 
Our findings contribute to the debate around CCTs (31, 32) by 
providing experimental evidence of effects on health in the 
US. Overall, these results offer a contrasted picture. Family 
Rewards improved subjective health, hope and dental care among 
poor families, thus contributing to reducing health 
disparities. However, it had no or limited effects on 
disparities in a range of other health outcomes. These 
findings suggest that in high-income countries, CCTs are 
likely to have smaller effects on health and need to operate 
alongside other social protection programs to reduce health 
disparities. While Family Rewards could have a direct effect 
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on health via increased health care utilization, our results 
imply that the mechanisms linking CCTs to health are complex 
and not fully addressed by the program as designed.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Family Rewards led to improvements in subjective health, 
levels of hope and dental care, but left unaffected other 
health measures. These findings suggest that CCTs in the US 
may contribute to reduce health disparities but also point to 
their limitations in a high-income context. Further 
experimental evidence is required to explain the relatively 
small changes in behaviors generated by the program. Future 
studies should also compare the health benefits of conditional 
relative to unconditional transfers (33), and examine 
potential long-term effects on children and families.  
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Exhibit List 
 
 
EXHIBIT 1. (table) 
Caption: Selected sample characteristics at randomization, 
overall and by assignment status, Opportunity NYC-Family 
Rewards experiment, 2007-2010 
Sources: Data are from Family Rewards baseline survey.  
Notes: Percentages may not add up due to rounding. The full 
table is included as Appendix Exhibit 2 (16). 
 
 
EXHIBIT 2. (table) 
Caption: Effect of the program on parental outcomes at 18 
months and 42 months, Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards 
experiment, 2007-2010 
Sources: Data are from Family Rewards baseline, 18-month and 
42-month surveys.  
Notes: A hyphen indicates that no data were available. Full 
results are presented in Appendix Exhibit 5 (16). The first 
two columns of the Exhibit present the adjusted proportion or 
mean for the control and treated groups. For example, at 42 
months, 34.4% of parents in the control group reported having 
two or more dental visits in the past 12 months, compared with 
47.4% of those in the program group. The third column 
corresponds to the adjusted difference between program and 
control obtained from a linear regression model. Family 
Rewards was associated for example with a 13 percentage point 
difference in the probability of reporting two or more dental 
visits in the past year compared to a control group who did 
not receive the intervention. For continuous scales such as 
the ‘State of Hope’ scale, program participation was 
associated with a 0.51-point increase at 42 months compared to 
the control group. All models controlled for selected baseline 
characteristics: age, gender, ethnic background, employment 
status, primary language and level of education. Robust 
standard errors were clustered at the household level. 
Statistical significance levels are reported as ***p<0.001; 
**p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
 
EXHIBIT 3. (table) 
Caption: Impact of the program on children outcomes at 18 
months and 42 months, Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards 
experiment, 2007-2010 
Sources: Data are from Family Rewards baseline, 18-month and 
42-month surveys.  
Notes: Full results are presented in Appendix Exhibit 6 (16). 
The first two columns of the Exhibit present the adjusted 
proportion or mean for the control and treated groups. For 
example, at 18 months, 60.5% of children in the control groups 
reported having two or more dental visits in the past 12 
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months, compared with 72.3% of those in the program group. The 
third column corresponds to the adjusted difference between 
program and control obtained from a linear regression model. 
Family Rewards was associated for example with an 11.8 
percentage point difference in the probability of having had 
at least two dental visits in the past year compared to a 
control group who did not receive the intervention. All models 
control for selected baseline characteristics: age, gender, 
ethnic background, household primary language and parental 
level of education. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the household level. Statistical significance levels are 
reported as ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
 
Exhibit 4. (figure) 
Caption: Contribution of individual factors to differences 
between program and control group in self-rated health and 
scale of hope score, Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards 
experiment, 2007-2010 
Sources: Data are from Family Rewards baseline, 18-month and 
42-month surveys.  
Notes: The exhibit details the contributions of the listed 
individual characteristics to the overall difference in self-
rated health and hope score. Full results are available in 
Appendix Exhibit 8 (16). Measures are from the 18-month survey 
for the self-rated health model and from the 42-month survey 
for the scale of hope score. The triangle point represents the 
total contribution of all individual factors to the observed 
difference in self-rated health and hope score respectively. 
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EXHIBITS 
 
Exhibit 1. Selected sample characteristics at randomization, overall 
and by assignment status, Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards experiment, 
2007-2010 
 
Overall Program Control 
Parents (N=4,749) 
One-parent family (%) 80.9 80.5 81.4 
Gender of primary parent (%)    
Female 94.6 94.9 94.2 
Race/ethnicity of primary parent (%)    
Hispanic/Latino 47.1 47.3 46.9 
Black 50.5 50.7 50.3 
Primary parent currently working (%) 51.1 49.9 52.4 
Primary parent working more than 30 hours (%) 19.7 19.2 20.3 
Health insurance coverage (%)    
Public health insurance 72.6 72.4 72.7 
Employer health insurance 18.9 19.4 18.3 
Other health insurance 2.8 2.7 2.8 
Not covered 5.8 5.4 6.1 
Had annual medical check-up when not sick    
Within the past year 81.7 81.9 81.3 
Had preventive dental check-up    
Within the past year 64.8 64.9 64.7 
Self-rated health (%)    
Excellent or very good 43.5 43.3 43.7 
Good 37.4 37.3 37.5 
Fair or poor 19.1 19.4 18.9 
Children (N=11,331) 
Parent’s rating of child’s health     
Excellent or very good 74.6 75.7 73.5 
Good 21.8 21.1 22.6 
Fair or poor 3.5 3.2 3.8 
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Exhibit 2. Effect of the program on parental outcomes at 18 
months and 42 months, Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards 
experiment, 2007-2010 
 18-month (N=3,082)  42-month (N=2,966) 
 Control Program Adjusted 
difference 
 Control Program Adjusted 
difference  
 
Preventive health care use and insurance coverage in the last 12 months 
Medical coverage (%) 94.3 95.3 1.0**  93.9 96.1 2.2** 
Children insurance coverage 
(%) 
92.8 94.7 1.9**  93.9 95.3 1.4 
Seen personal doctor (%) 80.2 84.1 3.9***  95.4 95.5 0.1 
2+ dental visits (%) 57.5 69.1 11.6***  34.4 47.4 13.0** 
Treated for any condition 
(%) 
41.9 46.1 4.2***  46.8 50.3 3.5 
Used emergency room as usual 
source of care (%) 
4.9 3.2 -1.7**  3.7 3.2 -0.5 
No medical care because of 
cost (%) 
9.2 6.3 -2.9***  8.1 5.1 -3.0** 
No prescription because of 
cost (%) 
14.6 14.2 -0.4  10.9 12.4 1.5 
 
Health outcomes 
Average self-rated health  3.05 3.2 0.15***  3.0 3.1 0.13 
Asthma (%) 15.3 17.4 2.1  16.5 16.7 0.2 
Average BMI 30.4 30.2 -0.2  30.4 30.1 -0.3 
High blood pressure (%) 20.4 21.2 0.8  24.8 26.2 1.4 
High cholesterol (%) 8.6 9.7 1.1  10.3 10.7 0.4 
Diabetes (%) 7.2 9.1 1.9  9.7 11.9 2.2 
Currently smoking (%) 23.3 20.7 -2.6  23.3 20.8 -2.5 
Average score on ‘State of 
Hope’ scale 
17.3 17.5 0.2  17.5 17.9 0.51*** 
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Exhibit 3. Impact of the program on children outcomes at 18 months 
and 42 months Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards experiment, 2007-2010 
 18-month (N=6,559)  42-month (N=6,464) 
 Control Program Adjusted  
difference 
 Control Program Adjusted  
difference 
 
Preventive health care use and insurance coverage in the last 12 months 
Has routine health care 
provider (%) 
93.6 93.9 0.3  91.2 92.6 1.4 
Has personal pediatrician 
(%) 
92.3 92.5 0.2  88.3 87.7 -0.6 
Had health check-up (%) 96.6 97.5 0.9  94.0 96.3 2.3 
2+ dental visits (%) 60.5 72.3 11.8***  48.3 62.9 14.6*** 
 
Physical health  
       
Average children’s health as 
rated by parents  
3.82 3.8 0.05  3.8 3.9 0.1 
Has any health condition (%) 28.2 27.2 -0.1  27.5 27.1 -0.4 
Has an attention deficit 
disorder (%) 
4.9 3.7 -1.2  3.6 3.1 -0.5 
Has asthma (%) 10.8 10.2 -0.6  9.1 9.6 0.48 
 
For children under 6 (in the last 12 months)  
Had physical examination (%) 97.1 97.6 0.6  96.2 99.0 2.8 
Had a dental check-up (%) 64.2 73.5 9.3  61.3 63.7 2.4 
Was screened for an early 
intervention program (%) 
24.9 33.5 8.6  24.7 30.8 6.1 
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Appendix Exhibit 1. Amount and schedule of the cash transfers 
offered by Family Rewards, Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards 
experiment, 2007-2010 
Domain Amount 
Education incentives  
Elementary and middle school 
students 
 
Attends 95% of scheduled 
school days a  
$25 per month 
Scores at proficiency level 
(or improvement) on annual 
math and English language 
arts (ELA) tests 
$300 per math test; $300 per 
ELA test for elementary 
school students. 
$350 per math test; $350 per 
ELA test for middle school 
students 
Parents reviews low-stakes 
interim test b 
$25 for parents to download, 
print and review results (up 
to 5 times per year) 
Parents discussed annual 
math and ELA test results 
with teachers a 
$25 (up to 2 tests per year) 
High school students  
Attends 95% of scheduled 
school days 
$50 per month 
Accumulates 11 course 
credits per year 
$600  
Passes Regents exams $600 per exam passed (up to 5 
exams) 
Takes PSAT test $50 for taking the test (up 
to 2 times) 
Graduates from high school $400 
All grades  
Parent attends parent-
teacher conferences 
$25 per conference (up to 2 
times per year) 
Child obtains library card a $50 once during the program 
Health incentives  
Maintaining public or private 
insurance a 
Per month: $20 (public); $50 
(private) for each parent 
covered 
Per month: $20 (public); $50 
(private) if all children are 
covered 
Annual medical checkup $200 per family member (once 
per year) 
Doctor-recommended follow-up 
visit a 
$100 per family member (once 
per year) 
Early-intervention evaluation 
for child under 30 months 
old, if advised by the 
pediatrician 
$200 per child (once per 
year) 
Preventive dental care $100 per family member (once 
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(cleaning/checkup) per year for children 1-5 
years old; twice per year for 
family members of 6 years of 
age or older) 
Workforce incentives  
Sustained full-time 
employment c 
$150 per month 
Education and training while 
employed at least 10 hours 
per week d 
Amount varied by length of 
course, up to a maximum of 
$3,000 over three years 
Source: Adapted from Riccio et al, 2010. Notes: In an effort 
to simplify the experiment, reduce its costs and improve its 
replicability if successful, a number of rewards were 
eliminated after the first year as noted in the table. The 
primary parent received the transfers corresponding to all 
health, work and elementary/middle school related rewards, 
while high school students, depending on the reward, directly 
received the entire payment or split half of the value with 
their parents. 
a Discontinued after Year 2 of the program. 
b Discontinued after Year 1 of the program. 
c Full-time employment is defined as working 30 hours per week. 
d The employment condition was removed after Year 2 of the 
program. 
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Appendix Exhibit 2. Randomization, program and follow-up of 
participants in Family Rewards, Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards 
experiment, 2007-2010 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Adapted from Riccio et al, 2010. Notes: MDRC identified 
the target sample based on the eligibility criteria described in the 
Exhibit and contact information from the NYC Department of 
Education. Seedco in partnership with Neighborhood Partner 
Organizations oversaw recruiting the families. MDRC calculated that 
a sample size of 5,100 families (2,550 per group) would give the 
study 80% power to detect effects on a range of outcomes, both for 
the full sample as well as by key demographic characteristics. MDRC 
implemented the randomization off site in batches using a random 
assignment algorithm to ensure appropriate randomization for each 
wave of recruitment. Random assignment was completed in January 
2008. Participants were notified of their allocation to the program 
or control group by letters sent by Seedco (treated group) or MDRC 
(control group). Families assigned to the program group were then 
scheduled for a program orientation session. Randomly-selected 
subgroups were used for the collection of the survey data at 18 and 
42 months but administrative data follow-up (not used in this 
analysis) was available for the full sample of participants.  
  
Program timeline 
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Appendix Exhibit 3. Technical Appendix, Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition 
 
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is a regression-based model 
which divides the gap in the outcome of interest between two 
groups into an ‘explained’ portion and an ‘unexplained’ 
portion.  The ‘explained’ portion of the gap corresponds to 
the difference in the outcome attributable to group 
differences in a set of measured predictor variables between 
the treated and control group. The ‘unexplained’ portion comes 
from differentials in how the predictor variables are 
associated with the outcomes in the control and treated 
groups. This is accomplished by building an OLS regression 
equation to obtain slope values (beta) for all variables of 
interest, and then varying the estimate (X) values of 
interest. 
 
After adjustment on parental baseline characteristics (gender, 
race/ethnicity, educational attainment, marital status, 
employment status, number of children and primary language 
spoken at home), we considered a range of predictor variables 
in our models: health insurance coverage (binary indicators of 
whether the respondent had medical coverage (of any type) in 
the previous month; and whether all dependent children had 
medical coverage (of any type) in the previous month); 
preventive health care use (binary indicators of whether the 
respondent had a health check-up since enrolment, had at least 
two dental visits in the past year and whether he/she was 
treated for any medical condition); unmet health care needs 
(two binary measures of whether the respondent did not have 
medical care because of cost in the past year and whether the 
respondent did not fill a prescription because of cost in the 
past year); financial wellbeing (financial wellbeing score and 
food security scale); and health behavior (binary indicator of 
whether the respondent was currently smoking). These factors 
were measured at 18 months for the self-rated health model and 
at 42 months for the state of hope model. 
 
We used the Oaxaca command in Stata 14 (18), with the pooled 
option to estimate coefficients for the explained portion of 
the model. We used the program group as the referent group. We 
also used the detail option of the command to subsume 
coefficients in larger predictor categories as listed above.  
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Appendix Exhibit 4. Effect of the program on self-reported and 
corrected BMI at 18 months and 42 months, Opportunity NYC-
Family Rewards experiment, 2007-2010 
 18-month (N=3,082)  42-month (N=2,966) 
 Control Program Adjusted 
difference 
 Control Program Adjusted 
difference  
Average BMI 30.4 30.2 -0.2  30.4 30.1 -0.4 
Corrected 
average BMIa 
31.3 31.2 -0.1  30.7 30.3 -0.4 
Sources: Data are from Family Rewards baseline, 18-month and 
42-month surveys.  
Notes: All models control for selected baseline 
characteristics: age, gender, ethnic background, household 
primary language and parental level of education. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the household level. 
Statistical significance levels are reported as ***p<0.001; 
**p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
a Corrected BMI is based on NHANES height and weight values 
corrected for gender- and ethnicity-specific reported bias.  
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Appendix Exhibit 5. Selected sample characteristics at 
randomization, overall and by assignment status, Opportunity NYC-
Family Rewards experiment, 2007-2010 
 
Overall Program Control 
Parents (N=4,749) 
One-parent family (%) 80.90 80.48 81.37 
Number of children under 19 (mean, 
SD) 
2.49 
(1.29) 
2.47 
(1.25) 
2.50 
(1.33) 
Primary language spoken is English 
(%) 
77.24 77.46 77 
Household earnings above 130% of 
poverty line (%) 
11.85 12.50 11.17 
Receiving TANF a (%) 24.01 24.81 23.21 
Receiving food stamps (%) 59.40 60.80 58.02 
Receiving housing assistance b (%) 53.35 52.14 54.56 
Primary parent  
Gender (%)    
Female 94.57 94.96 94.17 
Male 5.43 5.04 5.83 
Age (mean, SD) 
38.85 
(7.97) 
38.85 
(8.05) 
38.85 
(7.89) 
Race/ethnicity (%)    
Hispanic/Latino 47.13 47.32 46.95 
Black 50.53 50.74 50.34 
Other 2.32 1.94 4.15 
Education level (%)    
GED certificate c 11.20 9.95 12.45 
High school diploma 20.72 19.66 21.80 
Associate's degree/2-year college 8.56 8.75 8.36 
4-year college or beyond 7.73 7.89 7.57 
None of the above 51.79 53.74 49.82 
Currently working (%) 51.14 49.90 52.40 
Working more than 30 hours (%) 19.75 19.21 20.28 
Average weekly earnings of those 
currently working d (mean, SD) 
390.84 
(221.25) 
395.06 
(219.4) 
386.61 
(223.06) 
Health insurance coverage (%)    
Public health insurance 72.6 72.45 72.75 
Employer health insurance 18.88 19.40 18.35 
Other health insurance 2.77 2.75 2.79 
Not covered 5.76 5.40 6.11 
Had annual medical check-up when not 
sick 
   
Within the past year 81.69 81.98 81.30 
1-2 years ago 14.53 14.07 14.99 
More than 2 years ago 3.58 3.74 3.42 
Never 0.25 0.21 0.29 
Had preventive dental check-up    
Within the past year 64.83 64.96 64.70 
1-2 years ago 23.50 23.89 23.10 
More than 2 years ago 10.93 10.42 11.44 
Never 0.74 0.73 0.76 
Physical or mental health problem 
limiting work (%) 
21.95 22.76 21.14 
Self-rated health (%)    
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Excellent or very good 43.46 43.26 43.67 
Good 37.40 37.33 37.47 
Fair or poor 19.14 19.41 18.86 
Children (N=11,331) 
Gender (%)    
Female 49.95 49.86 50.14 
Male 50.05 50.24 49.86 
Age (mean, SD) 
10.64 
(4.26) 
10.54 
(4.3) 
10.71 
(4.22) 
Race/ethnicity (%)    
Hispanic/Latino 46.98 46.97 46.48 
Black 49.84 50.05 49.62 
Other 3.18 2.53 3.90 
Health insurance coverage (%)    
Public health insurance 81.07 81.12 81.03 
Employer health insurance 14.51 14.97 14.04 
Other health insurance 1.72 1.32 2.08 
Not covered 2.70 2.59 2.85 
Had annual medical check-up when not 
sick 
   
Within the past year 90.75 90.50 91.01 
1-2 years ago 8.34 8.47 8.21 
More than 2 years ago 0.75 0.80 0.70 
Never 0.15 0.23 0.07 
Had preventive dental check-up    
Within the past year 74.63 73.85 75.42 
1-2 years ago 17.16 18.14 16.17 
More than 2 years ago 3.06 2.93 3.19 
Never 5.15 5.08 5.21 
Physical or mental condition 
limiting work (%) 
13.29 12.92 13.65 
Parent’s rating of child’s health     
Excellent or very good 74.65 75.70 73.50 
Good 21.84 21.07 22.62 
Fair or poor 3.51 3.24 3.78 
Sources: Data are from Family Rewards baseline survey. Notes: 
Percentages may not add up due to rounding.  
a Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. 
b This category includes living in public housing and receiving 
Section 8 rental assistance. 
c General Education Development. 
d Earnings from work, in 2007 US dollars. 
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Appendix Exhibit 6. Effect of the program on parental outcomes 
at 18 months and 42 months, Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards 
experiment, 2007-2010 
 18-month (N=3,082)  42-month (N=2,966) 
 Control Program Adjusted 
difference 
 Control Program Adjusted 
difference 
Health insurance 
coverage 
       
Medical 
coverage in 
previous month 
(%) 
94.3 95.3 1.0** 
(0.1, 2.1) 
 93.9 96.1 2.2** 
(0.3, 4.0) 
All dependent 
children had 
coverage (%) 
92.8 94.7 1.9** 
(0.3, 2.9) 
 93.9 95.3 1.4 
(-0.8, 3.3) 
Preventive health 
care use 
       
Seen personal 
doctor/health 
care provider in 
past 12 months 
(%) 
80.2 84.1 3.9*** 
(2.7, 6.7) 
 95.4 95.5 0.1 
(-1.1, 1.5) 
At least two 
dental visits in 
the past year (%) 
57.5 69.1 11.6*** 
(8.6, 13.7) 
 34.4 47.4 13.0** 
(9.4, 16.0) 
Treated for 
any medical 
condition (%) 
41.9 46.1 4.2*** 
(0.4, 5.5) 
 46.8 50.3 3.5 
(-0.8, 5.6) 
Used emergency 
room as usual 
source of care in 
past year (%) 
4.9 3.2 -1.7** 
(-2.7, -
0.7) 
 3.7 3.2 -0.5 
(-1.8, 0.5) 
Unmet health care 
needs 
       
No medical 
care because of 
cost in past 12 
months (%) 
9.2 6.3 -2.9*** 
(-4.0, -
1.2) 
 8.1 5.1 -3.0** 
(-5.4, -0.3) 
Did not fill 
prescription 
because of cost 
in past 12 months 
(%) 
14.6 14.2 -0.4 
(-2.2, 1.4) 
 10.9 12.4 1.5 
(-1.9, 5.1) 
Physical health         
Average self-
rated health  
3.05 3.2 0.15*** 
(10.9, 
22.5) 
 3.0 3.1 0.13 
(-0.01, 0.2) 
Asthma (%) 15.3 17.4 2.1 
(-0.1, 3.7) 
 16.5 16.7 0.2 
(-2.8, 2.1) 
Average BMI 30.4 30.2 -0.2 
(-0.4, 0.2) 
 30.4 30.1 -0.3 
(-1.2, 0.4) 
High blood 
pressure (%) 
20.4 21.2 0.8 
(-1.7, 2.5) 
 24.8 26.2 1.4 
(-3.8, 5.4) 
High 
cholesterol (%) 
8.6 9.7 1.1 
(-0.8, 2.1) 
 10.3 10.7 0.4 
(-2.8, 3.5) 
Diabetes (%) 7.2 9.1 1.9 
(-0.3, 2.8) 
 9.7 11.9 2.2 
(-1.6, 4.9) 
Currently 
smoking (%) 
23.3 20.7 -2.6 
(-3.1, 2.9) 
 23.3 20.8 -2.5 
(-6.8, 1.9) 
Mental health        
Average score 
on ‘State of 
Hope’ scale 
17.3 17.5 0.2 
(-0.1, 0.5) 
 17.5 17.9 0.51*** 
(0.2, 0.8) 
Experience of 
serious 
psychological 
13.6 13.5 -0.1 
(-2.6, 1.8) 
 - - - 
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distress in the 
past month (%) 
Average score 
on k10 symptom 
scale 
19.7 19.2 -0.5 
(-1.6, 0.2) 
 - - - 
Sources: Data are from Family Rewards baseline, 18-month and 
42-month surveys. Notes: A hyphen indicates that no data were 
available. All models controlled for selected baseline 
characteristics: age, gender, ethnic background, employment 
status, primary language and level of education. Robust 
standard errors were clustered at the household level. 
Statistical significance levels are reported as ***p<0.001; 
**p<0.01; *p<0.05. 95% confidence intervals in parenthesis.  
 
